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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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6 JAN 1971

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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6 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 1)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 DECEMBER 1970 - 3 JANUARY 1971

Moscow (3263 items)

China	(5%)	7%
French CP 50th Anniversary	(1%)	7%
Cuban Anniversary	(0.1%)	5%
Basque Case	(1%)	4%
Indochina	(10%)	4%
Brezhnev New Year Address	(--)	3%
Kosygin ASAHI Interview	(--)	2%
Middle East	(1%)	2%
Angela Davis Case	(3%)	1%

Peking (2685 items)

Domestic Issues	(29%)	39%
Indochina	(41%)	16%
[NFLSV Anniversary	(25%)	12%]
New Year's Joint Editorial	(--)	9%
Japan	(0.3%)	7%
Polish Events	(13%)	5%
Cuban Anniversary	(--)	5%
Basque Case	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media in year-end reviews claim extensive military and political victories during 1970 and deprecate the U.S. Vietnamization policy. There are repeated pledges to fulfill the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament to continue the struggle until the "foreign aggressors" withdraw and the "puppets" collapse. As in past years, a PLAF Command communique rounds up military feats, and Hanoi propaganda continues to cite the 10 December DRV Party-Government appeal in pledging that support to the South will continue and in declaring that the North cannot be intimidated by threats of U.S. air strikes.

NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, in a New Year's greeting to the American people, asserts that various Americans have urged the Nixon Administration to pledge a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam by mid-1971 and to let the South Vietnamese settle their own affairs. In a New Year's message to the Vietnamese, Tho says that in addition to "combat victories" many "international successes and successes at the Paris peace conference" have been scored. Tho singles out the President's proposal for an in-place cease-fire in ridiculing the five-point proposal. There is a New Year's greeting from DRV President Ton Duc Thang to the Vietnamese, but no greeting to the American people comparable to Tho's. Year-end interviews granted foreign journalists by Pham Van Dong are not known to have been carried in DRV media as yet.

Peking hails the "spectacular victories" of the Indochinese people during the past year in a 31 December NCNA commentary which also derides the President's five-point peace proposal as an effort to gain through negotiations what was "impossible" on the battlefield.

Moscow's year-end propaganda on Vietnam is highlighted by Kosygin's remarks in his written response on international questions to the Tokyo ASAHI. As reported by TASS, Kosygin--in addition to routinely pledging material and political support--declared that "the Soviet Union is ready, on its part, to further facilitate the attainment of a political settlement in Indochina."

HANOI, FRONT ASSAIL PRESIDENT NIXON'S TV INTERVIEW

The President's remarks on Vietnam in his 4 January TV interview with four network correspondents have been seized upon by Hanoi and the Front as the latest in a series of statements by the

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President and other Administration spokesman which show U.S. intent to pursue the war through Vietnamization while paying lip service to a political settlement. The first monitored Vietnamese communist reaction to the interview came in a Hanoi domestic service radio broadcast at 1450 GMT on the 5th.* This commentary, repeated in a Hanoi broadcast to South Vietnam the next day, quotes the President as saying "we are on the way out of the Vietnam war, and in a way that will bring a just peace," and goes on to observe that these "deceitful allegations" are merely aimed at calming opponents of the war. In standard fashion, it says that contrary to "Nixon's lies" the United States is intensifying aggression through Vietnamization rather than bringing about a just peace.

The Hanoi commentary glosses over the President's detailed explanation of his "understanding" of when and what DRV targets would be bombed; it notes only that he said U.S. aircraft will continue to carry out reconnaissance "and will bomb and strafe important areas in the North if U.S. troops in the South are punished by the liberation armed forces." A report carried by VNA early on the 6th elaborates somewhat when it says that the President rehashed what he called an "understanding" as a pretext for reconnaissance flights and that he not only warned that he would bomb if the "spy" planes were fired upon but said "there are no restraints on us." The VNA report does not outline the other conditions under which bombing would be carried out, but it says: "As some of his interlocutors then showed their doubt about the so-called understanding and held that Nixon had enlarged the reasons for the bombing, he finally admitted that this was a 'new policy.'"

Minutes after transmitting this report, VNA carried the statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris which also deprecated the notion of an "understanding" between the DRV and the United States but similarly failed to acknowledge the

* The DRV Paris delegation spokesman issued a statement on the 5th, but it was not carried in regular DRV media until the 6th--by VNA in English at 0540 GMT and by Hanoi radio to the domestic audience and the South at 1115 and 1200 GMT, respectively.

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President's specific references to bombing of SAM sites and other military targets. (The President's similar remarks in his 10 December press conference had been duly noted, however.)* The Paris spokesman's statement says the President's unwillingness to end the war is further evidenced by his "vague" assurance that "we are on the way out of a combat role," rather than an announcement that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn. The spokesman says that "in brief" the President "invented false achievements and created an illusion of peace so as to deceive the people and conceal his policy of pursuing and prolonging the war."

Available Front comment on the President's interview includes a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 5th and an LPA commentary on the 6th.** Both note his reference to an "understanding," and the radio comment goes somewhat beyond other propaganda in acknowledging the nature of the President's remarks in this regard: It says "he piratically threatened that if there is no such 'tacit understanding--as asserted by the DRV'--then he is bound by no restrictions and will order attacks on military targets if necessary, when U.S. reconnaissance planes are fired on, and when U.S. troops in South Vietnam are threatened--that is, when they were punished by the South Vietnamese people."

The LPA commentary says President Nixon tried to create "an illusion of peace and fabricated imaginary victories of Vietnamization." It also makes a passing reference to Secretary Laird's forthcoming trip to Saigon, saying it is aimed at "pushing the Vietnamization of the war" and at "bolstering the Saigon stooges, reeling under the liberation forces' blows."

PARIS TALKS: PRG, DRV DEPLORE "THREATS" BY U.S. LEADERS

Hanoi gives standard, cursory attention to the 97th session of the Paris talks on 30 December. Thus, the VNA account notes without detail that both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and

* See the TRENDS of 16 December 1970, pages 7-8.

** TASS on the 5th reported that a "statement" was issued by the PRG spokesman in Paris, but it is not known to have been carried in Front or Hanoi media at this writing.

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and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy "condemned" Secretary Rogers for repeating, at his press conference of the 23d, "threats" against the DRV which had been voiced earlier by Secretary Laird and the President. And VNA notes that Thuy "again refuted" U.S. claims of an understanding on the bombing halt.

VNA also reports that Mme. Binh denounced violations of the Christmas truce* and that she concluded her statement with a plea for "a serious response" to the PRG's "logical and reasonable proposals, formulated with a view to effecting a cease-fire and putting an end to the war." VNA says that Xuan Thuy "at this year-end session" called on the Nixon Administration to seriously respond to the PRG's eight points and its 10 December statement on a cease-fire "in order to end the sufferings and afford an opportunity for all the U.S. military in Vietnam, including those captured, to rejoin their families."

VNA obscures the substance of the allied delegates' remarks--including the fact that Ambassador Bruce discussed Hanoi's "exploitation" of the POW issue and reviewed all of the 1970 U.S. proposals. VNA says only that the allies "tried to reverse right and wrong in an attempt to deny responsibility of the Nixon Administration over the past two years."

NFLSV CHAIRMAN THO SCORES NIXON CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

In his New Year's letter greeting the PLAF and the Vietnamese people, NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho assails President Nixon's five-point proposal of 7 October, with particular criticism of the call for a cease-fire in place. Tho repeats routine Liberation Radio comment last fall in saying that the cease-fire proposal is in fact aimed at legalizing U.S. troops' permanent occupation of South Vietnam and at maintaining the Thieu-Ky-Khiem "lackey clique."

* Liberation Radio has carried numerous reports of alleged allied violations of the PRG's three-day cease-fire over Christmas and New Year's. The propaganda claims that the PLAF seriously observed the cease-fire while the allies used the truce periods to commit "crimes" and conduct mop-up operations.

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Declaring that the Vietnamese have sustained hardships and sacrifices for 25 years, Tho says "more than anyone else, we are very eager for peace. We must have peace in order to rebuild the war-torn country. But the peace we want must be genuine peace in independence and freedom It must not be peace in bondage or peace fashioned by Nixon." Tho insists that the "proper basis" for settling the war is outlined in the PRG proposals, and he repeats the statement on a cease-fire first advanced by Mme. Binh at the Paris session on 10 December--that a cease-fire with the United States would occur if it declares that all troops will be withdrawn and with Saigon forces if there is agreement on a provisional coalition government.

Tho expresses resolve "to fight to the end, not to drop our weapons and not to let ourselves be fooled by Nixon's peace and cease-fire proposals." He concludes by quoting the passage from Ho's testament to the effect that the war may drag on and new sacrifices may be endured, but "we must be resolved to fight the U.S. aggressors till total victory."

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MOSCOW SAYS REMARKS BY PRESIDENT, LAIRD SHOW AGGRESSIVE INTENT

In standard fashion, TASS on 5 January promptly reported President Nixon's TV interview of the day before, mentioning his statements that "we can now see the end of the American combat role in Vietnam" and that U.S. troops will be withdrawn in a measured way on the basis that the South Vietnamese are able to take over. Reporting, however, that he said 280,000 U.S. troops will still remain in South Vietnam next May, TASS commented that the President is thus planning not to end American aggression but only to replace "some" American troops with South Vietnamese soldiers.

TASS also observed that although the President said he had "no desire to resume bombing of North Vietnam," he issued "direct threats" against the DRV, "illegally" arrogating to himself the right to order bombing strikes against "key districts" of the DRV "if there is a danger for American troops remaining in South Vietnam" and against "missile sites" if American planes flying over the North are fired upon. As in reports of the President's 10 December press conference, TASS once again avoided any reference to his remarks on an "understanding" on the bombing halt.

The only available followup comment on the interview to date, in a Moscow broadcast to North America on the 5th, says that the President "must have felt awkward during his interview, especially when he had to talk about the two problems that most disturb Americans--the economic situation and the war in Vietnam." The commentary says that although the President tried to make his audience believe U.S. forces are playing a less significant role, the air war has been escalated throughout Indochina, with "massive" raids even being carried out against the DRV. It concludes that since the President says this will continue and the Vietnamese will not give up their resistance, "there is no hope of the war ending."

Moscow carries news reports about Secretary Laird's trip to Paris and Saigon, and a 5 January PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov pegged to the Saigon trip, as summarized by TASS, recalls that in recent statements Laird has made it no secret that "he is preparing further expansion of the military operations." The Zhukov article cites the New York TIMES as reporting that Laird has said the lack of progress at the Paris talks "might serve as another justification of the resumption of the bombing raids on North Vietnam." It cites

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the Washington STAR as having said that the "mounting threats" to resume the bombing signify a presidential acknowledgment of failure of the Vietnamization policy and of the fact that "without direct American participation, the South Vietnamese army will be easily overrun by the enemy."

Asking rhetorically if Laird is not carrying to Saigon plans for continued war, Zhukov remarks that in less than two years, in the general elections, the American voters will remind the Republicans of their promises to end the war.

TASS CITES KOSYGIN ON READINESS TO "FACILITATE" SETTLEMENT

TASS carried a fuller version of Kosygin's interview with the Japanese paper ASHI than that broadcast by Moscow radio's domestic service on the 2d and published in the central press on the 3d. Summarizing his remarks on Vietnam, the domestic radio and press version reports him as saying only that neither an expansion of U.S. aggression in Indochina nor Vietnamization of the war will bring victory to the United States; that the Soviet Union--like other socialist countries--will continue to render all possible support to the people of "Indochina" in repulsing the "armed imperialist intervention"; and that it is the Soviet conviction that the PRG and DRV proposals form a good and realistic basis for solution of the Vietnam issue.

The more detailed TASS version notes that Kosygin prefaced his remarks on support by referring to the assertion in the 17 December Soviet Government statement that the USSR "will draw the appropriate conclusions in connection with the barbaric air raids on North Vietnam and the threat to expand aggression against that fraternal socialist state." TASS also reports his remarks elaborating on the basic substance of the Vietnamese communist proposals--for a U.S. troop withdrawal and the formation of a provisional coalition government--and his specific reference to the "recent" PRG proposal that the United States declare its readiness to withdraw troops by 30 June 1971 so that there can be an immediate discussion of the security of the withdrawing troops.

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SOVIET ROLE IN SETTLEMENT The version transmitted by TASS also quotes Kosygin's remarks in which he made one of his infrequent references to a possible Soviet role in a political settlement. According to TASS, he said: "The Soviet Union is ready, on its part, to further facilitate the attainment of a political settlement in Indochina which, of course, should meet the lawful interests and aspirations of the peoples of that area."

BACKGROUND: While Kosygin's current remark is not included in the shorter, identical reports broadcast by Moscow radio's domestic service and published in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR, similar remarks relating to a possible Soviet role in a Vietnam settlement have appeared in the press in the past. For example, a 13 July 1968 Kosygin press conference in Stockholm was reported by PRAVDA as well as TASS. At that time, asked whether in view of the impasse in the DRV-U.S. talks in Paris the Soviet Union might act as an intermediary, Kosygin said: "We are for stopping the war in Vietnam, and we are doing everything possible toward that end." He went on to voice approval of the Paris bilateral talks, with the caveat that they would not be able to make progress until there was a halt in the U.S. bombing of the DRV, but that since the two sides were meeting the question of mediation did not arise--"particularly since the DRV is a sovereign state."

Since the escalation of the war in 1965, Moscow has been reluctant to make any public move for negotiations and has taken care never to move out ahead of the DRV. A notable exception occurred in February 1967 during Kosygin's visit to Britain. In a speech on 8 February, atypically acknowledging the Geneva conference cochairmen's responsibility, he said that because "the United Kingdom's voice is heeded by many" the USSR believes that "now, as in 1954, Great Britain jointly with the Soviet Union and other countries could make its contribution to the settlement of the Vietnam issue" The joint communique on that visit said that the two governments would make "every possible effort with a view to achieving a settlement."

Kosygin also implied a Soviet role when he expressed concern to bring the war to an end in a 2 October 1967 speech in Kishinev. After recalling past Soviet efforts to preserve world peace, he said: "The Soviet Union considers it of major importance to stop the war in Vietnam and bring about a stable relaxation of tension in Europe."

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COMMUNISTS REVIEW 1970 ACHIEVEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

PLAF The PLAF Command's year-end communique--dated
COMMUNIQUE 30 December and broadcast on 2 January--
 indirectly reflects the reduced level of
fighting and absence of major communist attacks in its claims
of communist achievements. Unlike other year-end communiques
since 1966, this year's gives no statistics on military units
put out of action. The usual evaluations of allied failures
are included, however, with the communique claiming that the
Nixon Administration has been "compelled" to continue the
strategy started in 1968 after the Tet offensive and to
"de-escalate the war, shift to the defensive, and gradually
withdraw troops." Like other propaganda, the communique says
the Vietnamization policy has been driven into "an increasingly
unstable position" and faces "the danger of inevitable defeat."

The PLAF communique claims that 420,000 allied troops were
"annihilated" in 1970--the lowest total since 1967, when
365,000 were claimed*--and that 110,000 of the casualties were
U.S. or "satellite" troops, the lowest figure for foreign
troops since 1965. Although there is a sharp drop in the
figure on U.S. and other foreign casualties in comparison to
the claimed 235,000 in 1969, the communique comments in
another context that "U.S. casualties were not lowered as
expected" because U.S. troops had to leave their bases and
"participate in combat to rescue the Saigon puppet troops."**
Other statistics include the alleged destruction of 5,900
planes and 14,000 vehicles. This compares with the alleged
destruction of 6,400 planes and 19,000 vehicles in 1969.

* PLAF communiques claimed a total of 645,000 allied
casualties in 1969 and 630,000 in 1968.

** U.S. and other foreign losses were listed as 230,000 in
1968 and 170,000 in 1967. In 1966 the PLAF communique
claimed that 108,000 U.S. and nearly 10,000 "satellite"
troops were killed, wounded, or captured, adding that the
number of U.S. troops "annihilated" was more than five
times the total number of U.S. troops eliminated in 1965.

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The PLAF communique also hails insurgent "victories" in Cambodia and Laos. It says that allied expansion of the war in Indochina will result in failure and that "the resistance forces will be strengthened and will create a new strength and a new combat posture in order to score greater and greater victories" Going beyond the common allegation that the antigovernment forces in Cambodia control two-thirds of the land and three million people, the communique claims that they now control seven-tenths of the territory with about four million people.

OTHER COMMENT Other Hanoi and Front propaganda also reviews the military developments in Indochina in the past year and reaffirms determination to press on to final victory. A 2 January Liberation Radio commentary, for example, claims that the United States has suffered "grave defeats" in the past three years and that the "U.S.-puppet" forces have "become obviously weaker and revealed many new deficiencies and gaps." It warns, however, that the "U.S. imperialists" are "stubborn and reckless" and "are making extensive preparations for new military adventures in Laos and Cambodia and are attempting to harass the northern part of our country in order to salvage their deadlocked situation."

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 3d praises the successes outlined in the PLAF communique, concluding that "our struggle will continue to undergo difficulties and hardships, but we will certainly achieve complete victory." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial on the same day maintains that the United States "sustained heavy defeats" in its "dark scheme to Vietnamize the war and will be unable to avoid total defeat."

LAOS:- NEW PROPOSAL ON BOMBING HALT FOR KHANG KHAY MEETING

On 5 January the Pathet Lao news agency reported an NLHS communique on a 31 December meeting between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong's special envoy, Tiao Souk Vongsak, which says that Souk advanced a "new proposal" on a bombing halt to make possible the Khang Khay meeting of plenipotentiaries. Billed as a "new effort and a big compromise," the proposal calls for a suspension of "all bombings, strafings, and other activities" of the U.S., Vientiane, and other pro-U.S. air forces in Xieng Khouang Province and along "a corridor

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10 kilometers wide from Sam Neua to Khang Khay" for 10 days before the meeting, during the meeting, and for seven days after it.*

The communique reports that Souvanna Phouma repeated his "absurd demand" for withdrawal of "so-called" North Vietnamese troops in Laos and for a 15-kilometer "safe zone" around Khang Khay, but it concludes with the hope that Souvanna Phouma will express his view of the new proposal at the next meeting.

* At a 24 November meeting the NLHS had for the first time proposed a bombing halt over Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces. At a 1 December meeting the time period was reduced to the number of days stipulated in the current proposal. See the TRENDS of 2 December, pages 14-15, and 9 December, pages 9-10.

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MIDDLE EAST

KOSYGIN AFFIRMS NEED FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WITHDRAWAL

Standard Soviet positions on the Middle East are reiterated by Kosygin in his reply to questions on the international situation by the Japanese newspaper ASAHI. In his response regarding the Middle East, as reported by TASS on 2 January, Kosygin affirms the long-standing Soviet call for a political settlement based on fulfillment of all provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. He points out that the resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and recognition of the right of every state in the area to live in peace. Soviet support for the national rights, security, and independence of all states of the area had last been declared at an elite level by Gromyko in his 21 October UNGA speech and by Brezhnev on 28 August in Alma-Ata. While both also voiced support for the "just rights" of the Arab people of Palestine, Kosygin makes no mention of the Palestinians in his remarks for ASAHI.

He notes that the UAR and Jordan have stated their readiness to fulfill Resolution 242 and enter into contact with Ambassador Jarring, but he does not take the occasion to refer to Israel's late December decision to return to the Jarring talks. He routinely complains that a political settlement is being impeded by the "obstructionist position" of Israel and the United States, adding that without U.S. money and arms deliveries the "aggressor" would have had to restrain its belligerency. Kosygin insists that the USSR "sincerely strives" for the establishment of a lasting peace in the area, and rejects as "deliberate lies and slander" allegations "by our ill-wishers" about any other aims of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. Such references to "anti-Soviet slander," which appear infrequently in routine propaganda, have not occurred at the elite level since Gromyko's UNGA address and the Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 8 October.

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MOSCOW CITES PESSIMISTIC FORECASTS FOR JARRING TALKS

While Soviet propagandists, as last summer, profess to see the resumption of the Jarring talks as creating possibilities for settling the Middle East crisis, Moscow at the same time notes little optimism about the talks in "Western press forecasts" and in the opinion of unidentified "observers," and it cites UAR UN representative az-Zayyat as saying he does not see signs of Israeli good will. Presenting the Arabs as prepared to cooperate with Jarring, commentators continue to charge the Israelis with attempting to sabotage his mission and with planning to use it as a smokescreen for their "aggressive intentions." Israel's decision on returning to the Jarring contacts is variously attributed to the country's loss of international support or-- in a 4 January Arabic-language commentary assailing U.S. policy-- to American pressure following Washington's failure to achieve its aims of splitting the Arabs, creating discord between the Arabs and "their friends," and imposing its will on them.

A foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 5th calls the starting of the talks a "very important event," and says they "should and must" present a real possibility of eliminating the Middle East crisis. The main point, he adds, is that these contacts should not turn into lip service without any "real communication" between the sides. But Tsoppi finds it "disquieting" that Israeli leaders, rather than taking a clear and realistic attitude toward the subject of the talks-- implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, particularly Israeli withdrawal--make "threatening speeches" against the Arabs.

A Koryavin article in IZVESTIYA, reported by TASS on the 5th, also says that "all objective opportunities" exist for settling the Middle East situation, but calls attention to the fact that Jarring had no sooner resumed his duties than Tel Aviv "began to talk of all kinds of 'conditions' and 'reservations' by which Israel may agree to the resumption of contacts." He also complains of "aggressive" Israeli statements, citing Mrs. Meir as saying that Israeli withdrawal "is 'out of the question,'" and noting Israeli "manipulations over the question of 'safe frontiers' and demagoguery about imaginary peace" which would mean Arab capitulation.

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NIXON TV
INTERVIEW

The Tsoppi commentary, charging that Israel's policy of obstructing a peaceful solution is connected with U.S. support, goes on to cite remarks by President Nixon "on the evening before" the resumption of the Jarring mission. Without identifying the occasion--the President's 4 January television interview--he says that the President "found it necessary to reaffirm his assurance to assist Israel" to maintain the military equilibrium. To Washington and Tel Aviv, Tsoppi adds, this means large-scale shipment of arms for "renewed provocations." Up to now, Tsoppi says, U.S. actions, "both overt and covert, have not helped eliminate the dispute."

Briefly reporting the President's remarks on the Middle East in the 4 January interview, TASS on the 5th says he glossed over the "key problem" of a political settlement, that of Israeli withdrawal. The President said, TASS adds, that the key to peace is held not only by the parties directly involved but also by the Big Four, which must join efforts to help establish peace in the area, and which must and will be in a position to guarantee whatever settlement is made through the United Nations. TASS notes that the President at the same time stressed that the United States will continue to support Israel and that he made it clear that the \$500 million aid program is intended for the purchase of U.S. weapons. TASS offers the routine criticism that by supplying money and arms the United States encourages the "Israeli extremists" to further sabotage a political settlement.

JARRING
ACTIVITIES

Summarizing U Thant's 5 January report to the Security Council on Jarring's activities since December 1967, TASS that day said Jarring's correspondence with the direct participants demonstrated that his appeals met with positive response from the UAR and Jordanian governments but encountered a policy of sabotage of a peaceful political settlement from Israel. TASS concluded that Israel's consent to resumption of contacts does not dispel concern about its intentions, and mentioned press reports of Israeli insistence on speeded-up shipments of U.S. arms.

Moscow's domestic service on the 4th had noted briefly that Jarring had met that day with UAR, Jordanian, and Israeli representatives and "it is believed" he discussed procedural issues regarding resumption of his mission. Reporting on the

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5th that Jarring had announced his readiness to continue his mission, the domestic service said he would hold his "first contacts" that day concerning procedure for the first steps toward renewing the talks, broken off "through the fault of Israel." The report recalled that the Israeli leaders had recently stressed that they were interested only in a cease-fire, and it charged that Tel Aviv did not intend to fulfill UN resolutions on the Middle East, a stand which caused "justified alarm" among the world public. Moscow at the same time cited the Arab press as saying that the UAR will not agree to another extension of the cease-fire agreement if Israel does not adopt a "constructive position" regarding a settlement.

WITHDRAWAL Cairo's call for a withdrawal timetable as a
"TIMETABLE" condition for a cease-fire extension is brought
 up by domestic service commentator Ryzhikov,
without, however, specifically offering Soviet support for
the idea. Moscow's first--and thus far only--formal endorsement
of the timetable concept came in the 20 December communique
concluding Ponomarev's UAR visit; it was not repeated in the
communique a week later on the Moscow visit of a UAR delegation
led by 'Ali Sabri. Ryzhikov, in his commentary on the 4th, said
presentation of a timetable or of "an indication of the time of
withdrawal" would have been considered by Cairo as the best
proof of a serious Israeli attitude toward the New York talks.
He added that Cairo had made it clear that only "positive"
Israeli steps in implementing Resolution 242 could make the
Jarring mission successful. He cited Israeli Prime Minister
Meir as declaring that a withdrawal timetable could not even
be a subject for discussion.

AS-SADAT Briefly reporting UAR President as-Sadat's
REMARKS 2 January statement at a meeting of Egyptian
 journalists and intellectuals, TASS on the
3d cited him as saying that unless Israeli troops were with-
drawn the UAR would not regard itself as bound to observe
the cease-fire agreement. On the 4th, TASS noted that,
according to AL-AHRAM, the main item at a session of the
UAR's supreme civil defense council was the preparation of
the country for any possible development after the 5 February
expiration of the cease-fire.

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'TASS' brief 5 January report on as-Sadat's speech at a rally in Tanta on the 4th said that the UAR president "highly appreciated" the Soviet Union's stand regarding the Middle East conflict and its assistance to the UAR. Not surprisingly, 'TASS' did not acknowledge as-Sadat's statement that the USSR last January agreed to Nasir's request that Soviet missiles "be accompanied by Soviet soldiers" until the Egyptians were trained. (Cairo radio's version of the speech deleted his admission--reported by REUTERS and Jerusalem radio--that six Russian soldiers were killed in an Israeli bombing raid.)

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

POLEMICAL EXCHANGE TRIGGERED BY POLISH DEVELOPMENTS

An authoritative exchange of polemics at the turn of the year has underscored the intractable nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict notwithstanding the relatively calm atmosphere accompanying the Peking talks. Moscow moved to the level of a PRAVDA editorial article in responding to Peking's effort to read anti-Soviet implications into the Polish disturbances and in warning against Chinese meddling in East Europe. Peking returned to the attack in its New Year's Day joint editorial, crowing that Gomulka "went the same way as Khrushchev and Novotny" and that Moscow's "colonial rule" in East Europe is in "a deep crisis." At the same time, Kosygin has reaffirmed Moscow's interest in following the negotiating track and normalizing relations, and Peking at least pulled one offensive punch that marked its joint editorial for New Year's Day 1970.

MOSCOW A PRAVDA editorial article on 31 December likened Peking's comment on the Polish troubles to the "speculations, juggling with facts, and outrageous lies" provided by "imperialist propaganda." In what may have been the principal message of the article, PRAVDA argued that the point at issue is not the ideological differences between Peking and the Soviet bloc but "the most impudent interference" by Peking in the internal affairs of Poland. PRAVDA added pointedly that Poland has diplomatic relations with the PRC. Moscow's point had been made more directly by Warsaw in a 23 December broadcast terming the preceding day's PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on Poland a cold shower for those (unnamed) who might have thought Peking was seeking normalization of relations with East Europe.

PRAVDA reacted sharply to Peking's claim that the Soviets had moved troops to the Polish borders during the disturbances, a charge which it derided as "pure provocation" and as exceeding anything in the Western press except a Spanish weekly's charge that Soviet intervention was prepared. Expressing Moscow's irritation over the Chinese breach of polemical restraint, PRAVDA complained that Peking's charges pegged to the Polish troubles do not differ in aim and spirit from the hostile Chinese attacks at the height of the cultural revolution. Pinpointing Peking's aim as directed

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toward dividing "the socialist community," PRAVDA recalled that the Chinese had revealed the same intent "from the very start" of the U.S. bombing of the DRV and at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis.

While feeling constrained to respond to Peking's attempt to capitalize on the Polish troubles, Moscow has again recorded its commitment to normalization of bilateral relations. In his interview published in the Japanese paper ASAHI on 1 January and carried by TASS on the 2d, Kosygin claimed that Moscow has consistently sought good-neighborly relations with the PRC and demonstrated its readiness for talks. In the first Soviet elite reference to recent steps toward normalizing relations,* he noted that the two sides had exchanged ambassadors and "agreed to expand trade," adding that they are conducting talks in Peking. While reaffirming Soviet good will in seeking to settle differences, Kosygin hinted at Soviet displeasure with the conduct of the Peking talks in observing that normalization requires efforts by both sides. But unlike his comments on the talks last June, he did not blame the Chinese directly for dragging out the talks, nor did he complain about Peking's anti-Soviet polemics.

Kosygin's remarks seem to have been intended for international rather than Soviet domestic consumption. The Tokyo-dated TASS report carried in the Moscow papers on 3 January--briefer than an account disseminated by TASS under a Moscow dateline, not used in the press--included only his statement that the Soviets have no lack of good will but that normalization must be pursued by both sides. The version carried in the press thus omitted his references to the talks and the agreements on ambassadors and trade. This reticence accords with Brezhnev's failure to mention Sino-Soviet relations in his major address in Yerevan on 29 November, not long after the trade agreement had been announced and the Chinese ambassador had arrived in Moscow.

Soviet misgivings over Peking's behavior, despite the recent steps toward normalizing relations, have been spelled

* In an interview with the Indian PATRIOT on 10 August, Kosygin said agreement had been reached to exchange ambassadors and that a Chinese ambassador "evidently" would be coming to Moscow. The interview was not published in Soviet media.

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out in comment broadcast to the Chinese. Moscow has adopted the line that in taking these steps and muting its polemics Peking has merely made cosmetic "tactical changes" without altering its essentially anti-Soviet policy. Thus a broadcast in Mandarin on 3 January, assessing the significance of Peking's hostile comment on the Polish developments, concluded that the Chinese have shifted tactics in their approach to the other socialist countries but have persisted in their hostility toward "the socialist community." The broadcast made a point of invoking VWP First Secretary Le Duan's congratulatory message to newly elected Polish party chief Gierk as evidence of good Polish-DRV relations. Another Mandarin broadcast, on the 4th, pressed the charge that Peking has stubbornly refused to undertake joint action on Vietnam and has engaged in divisive practices within the communist movement. The broadcast labeled the Chinese leaders "renegades of Marxism-Leninism and accomplices of imperialism."

Despite the harsh language questioning Peking's sincerity in seeking normalization of relations, Soviet comment has not directly linked the hostile polemics with the state of the protracted Peking talks.

PEKING The New Year's Day joint editorial by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY followed up on Peking's earlier comment on the Polish disturbances by attacking Moscow's "colonial" role in East Europe and hailing Gomulka's fall as a sign of "the further bankruptcy of modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its center."* But while probing a particularly sore subject that has proven inflammatory in Sino-Soviet relations, the editorial was less provocative than last year's in that it avoided direct attacks on the Brezhnev leadership.

A lowered level of Sino-Soviet tension is also reflected in this New Year's editorial. Where last year's editorial quoted Mao as calling for urgent preparations for a possible nuclear war, this year's featured Mao's 20 May

* The 22 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and an Albanian article on the Polish situation--both of which were repeatedly broadcast in Peking's Russian service--have been published in RED FLAG's first issue of 1971 under the heading "The Colonial Rule of Social Imperialism Has Become Mired in a Deep Crisis."

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statement that the danger of a world war still exists but that "revolution is the main trend" today. Playing on another major theme of the past year, it declared that many "medium-sized and small nations have risen against the power politics of the two superpowers," and it introduced a new note by proclaiming that "at no time will China ever behave like a superpower, neither today nor in the future."

Curiously, in view of Peking's recent diplomatic advances, the joint editorial did not renew last year's invocation of peaceful coexistence and registered the diplomatic developments only in the stock claim that China's foreign relations "are daily developing." What it did reflect, in this context, is Peking's improved relations with Hanoi and Pyongyang, an important element in the more flexible, less sectarian Chinese approach to the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the past year. The editorial cited Peking's close relations with the North Vietnamese and North Korean parties as well as with the Albanians in a passage referring to "genuine Marxist-Leninist parties." During the period of strained Chinese relations with Hanoi and Pyongyang, only the Albanian party had been singled out in this way.

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POLAND AND USSR

The unheralded brief visit of the new Polish leaders to Moscow on 5 January, capped within 10 hours by a joint statement calculated to underscore Soviet-Polish harmony, came in the wake of speculation in the West about possible frictions between Moscow and the reformist regime brought to power in Warsaw by last month's disorders. It also followed the appearance of some freewheeling comment in the Polish press, notably an article in the weekly POLITYKA urging a new, open leadership "style," which may well have conjured up Soviet fears of a second "Prague spring" in Poland. While the statement claims unity on all questions discussed with the Polish leaders, it withholds specific Soviet endorsement of the new regime's reform measures.

NEW POLISH LEADERS PAY ONE-DAY "FRIENDLY" VISIT TO MOSCOW

Moscow and Warsaw media on the morning of 5 January reported the arrival in the Soviet capital that day of the new Polish leaders, PZPR First Secretary Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz, on a "friendly" visit at the invitation of the CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers. In addition to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Katushev, the CPSU secretary in charge of relations with ruling communist parties, two top economic figures--Soviet planning chief Baybakov and CEMA representative Lesechko--were on hand to welcome the visitors at the airport. Barely 10 hours after its report of the Polish leaders' arrival, TASS reported their departure for home and summarized a "statement for the press" on their talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Evidently designed to counter conjectures about discord between Moscow and the Gierek-Jaroszewicz regime, the statement cites "complete unity" of views on all questions discussed and describes the atmosphere of the talks as one of "cordial friendship and fraternal mutual understanding." The two sides' views are said to have coincided on, among other things, their respective treaties with West Germany and their continued "solidarity" with the GDR. With respect to the Polish domestic scene, however, the statement says only that the Polish leaders "spoke about" their latest "economic and social measures"; as reported by TASS, it registers no Soviet endorsement of the measures and no Soviet reaction to the Polish presentation.

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Soviet media's treatment of the Polish scene continues to consist mainly of TASS reports on the restoration of "normal" conditions and of comment drawn selectively from the Polish press. Aside from a 24 December PRAVDA dispatch from Warsaw by Averchenko, the only original Soviet comment has been keyed by foreign policy aspects of the Polish developments--a 31 December PRAVDA editorial attacking Peking's exploitation of the events* and a Nekrasov article on the European security aspect in the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM which appeared on 4 January. ZA RUBEZHOM pointed to the new Polish regime's reiteration of support for a European security conference and said NATO circles had hoped in vain that the events in Poland would adversely affect the prospects for such a conference.

GIEREK, POLISH WEEKLY STRESS NEED FOR REGIME-WORKER CONTACTS

Gierek's statements and activities in the days prior to his departure for Moscow bespeak a growing effort to get close to the workers and solve the country's problems without outside help, in contrast to the strong emphasis on "law and order" and loyalty to the Soviet Union in his speech on taking office on 20 December. Thus in his New Year's message, carried live in the Warsaw domestic service on the evening of 31 December, Gierek made no direct reference to the riots but directed a new implicit criticism at his predecessor, Gomulka, in noting that "the history of our nation knows many lessons which have been wasted." The PZPR First Secretary paid only a general tribute to "our alliances" in extending New Year's greetings to "the nations of the Soviet Union and all socialist countries."

Underscoring the need for "mutual trust" between the regime and society, in the main body of his message, Gierek added that state policy "should be clear and understandable to all; practice should not contradict words; decisions and actions should emerge from frank, direct dialogs with the working class, with the whole nation." Declaring that "everything depends on us alone," he did not mention in this context the assistance also available from economic cooperation among the socialist countries. Rather, he called on the country to "look around and count our forces."

* The Averchenko dispatch is discussed in the 30 December TRENDS, pages 14-15. See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion of the PRAVDA editorial.

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Also on the 31st, PAP reported a direct dialog between Gierek and Warsaw factory workers that day, in line with the current policy of such visits by Politburo figures to enterprises throughout the country. The PAP report seemed at pains to stress that Gierek, in speaking to workers at the Warszawa Steel Works, "maintained the whole of his speech in the vein of a direct talk and frank exchange of views" with those present at the meeting. It highlighted his statement that "we shall endeavor, as possibilities will allow, to meet as quickly as possible the most urgent needs of our nation, and the working class in particular."

POLITYKA A "leading article" in the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA,
ARTICLE excerpted at length by PAP on 31 December, departed from orthodox assertion of the party's leading role in stressing instead both the party's culpability for the December riots and the inadequacy of mere party organizational changes to improve the situation without concrete economic measures. The article declared that "it is the party which bears the responsibility for the sources which generated the tragic events," adding that "this is how our contemporaries are seeing it and how history will evaluate it."

POLITYKA went on to say that the "tragedies" of December "must be regarded as an alarm signal pointing to an ailment existing in the organism, all the more disturbing in that it has resounded for the second time during the 25-year existence of socialist Poland." While conceding that the 20 December PZPR plenum "chose the only correct road" in the "dangerous" situation by making changes in the leadership, it stressed in the same breath that "mere changes in the leading posts will neither supply money to the state treasury nor commodities to the economy." There must be a "new style" in jointly developing party decisions on the country's problems, without "secrecy," and "only on such a foundation will a real unity of the whole party be achieved, as well as the party's collective sense of responsibility before the nation."

Implicit blame of Gomulka for the riots pervaded the article, POLITYKA remarked that the disorders "made the party and all the links of the people's power aware of the depth of the political crisis which had taken shape in our country." In the period leading up to the disturbances, it said, "elements of stagnation were gradually accumulating in the economy, while the propaganda picture often departed from the real

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situation." It referred, in separate subsequent passages, to the "statistical optimism" and "cheap optimism" peddled by the previous leadership, in contrast to the "realism" promised by Gierek.

YUGOSLAV Belgrade correspondents' reports have pointed up
EVALUATION the "reform" atmosphere pervading the new Polish regime's policies, as well as the new frankness in Polish information media. Thus TANYUG on 3 January reported BORBA's Warsaw correspondent as commenting, in anticipation of the next PZPR plenum, that "there are no more doubts that a Polish formula must be presented" but that "there remains just one delicate question: Is the country to go into reform in a radical or an evolutionary manner?" The radical route, "no matter how desirable, is considered here to be unrealistic," the correspondent added.

On the 29th, BORBA's correspondent commented that the "improved" Polish climate "is naturally noticed most definitely in the press." Despite "understandable" appeals for order and discipline, the correspondent said, "newspapers are nevertheless becoming a freer agent than they were until now," and "all this pleases the Polish reader."

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EUROPEAN ISSUES

KOSYGIN REJECTS LINKAGE OF SECURITY CONFERENCE TO BERLIN

Kosygin took the occasion of his year-end interview with the Japanese newspaper ASAHI to renew Moscow's call for the "speediest convocation" of a conference on European security and to reiterate Soviet objections to linkage of such a conference with progress on a Berlin settlement. In line with the 2 December statement on European security by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, he welcomed the Finnish proposal of 25 November for preparatory meetings in Helsinki and said it is important to start holding such meetings "as early as possible in the new year."

Kosygin stressed that "sufficient preconditions" have been created for the calling of a conference and that there is no reason to delay it or to raise preliminary conditions. He singled out NATO as the chief opponent of a conference and cited its communique last month--following a meeting of the Council in Brussels--making the convening of a conference "dependent on the settlement of questions connected with West Berlin." Kosygin argued that while "no international question . . . exists in a vacuum," this fact does not give anyone the right to declare the settlement of some questions as a preliminary condition for the settlement of others. He went on to assert that one cannot "demand of the Soviet Union unilateral concessions, the more so on a question in whose solution others should in any case be interested no less than we. Such an approach leads to procrastination and hinders an improvement of the situation in Europe." Kosygin's remarks on the linkage question are included in the 2 January TASS account of the interview under a Moscow dateline--the longest Soviet report--but do not appear in a briefer Tokyo-dated TASS summary published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 3d.

Since the issuance of the NATO Council communique in early December, Moscow propaganda has routinely complained about the effort to tie a conference to progress in the Berlin talks. One panelist in the Moscow domestic service round-table of 13 December, for example, in a discussion of the relationships among the recent NATO Council and Warsaw Pact meetings, the Warsaw-Bonn treaty, the four-power talks,

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and the European security conference, declared that the West "should remember once and for all that political blackmail has never been successful" when relations between the USSR and other socialist states are involved. Detente is a "two-sided process," the commentators stressed, noting that while the socialist countries are normalizing their relations with Bonn, there must be a concurrent normalization of relations between the Western powers and the GDR--that is, respect for the rights and sovereignty of the GDR regarding the West Berlin problem.

On the 15th, a TRUD article asserted that the Western powers are "demanding 'concessions'" when they delay the convening of a security conference pending a "solution of the Berlin question" and are ignoring the GDR's "legal rights" regarding West Berlin. Noting "talk" in NATO circles to the effect that Bonn had made a "concession" to the USSR by signing the Soviet-FRG treaty, the article declared that "inventions about 'unilateral concessions' are closely calculated as blackmail vis-a-vis the Soviet Union."

SOVIET, GDR LEADERS TOUCH ON FOUR-POWER TALKS ON BERLIN

Kosygin in his ASAHI interview and Ulbricht in a New Year's eve address over the East Berlin radio hewed to standard lines on the Berlin question. Kosygin's assertion that there can be no demand for "unilateral concessions" prefaced a brief comment on the continuing four-power ambassadorial talks on Berlin--most recently in session on 10 December, with the next meeting scheduled for 19 January. The USSR, Kosygin said, is "ready to take the necessary steps to reach an agreement" on Berlin, and "if the other side in the negotiations is also ready to take such steps, the problem will be solved." He went on to repeat the formulation used in Brezhnev's 29 December November Yerevan speech--and recurrently in Soviet propaganda since then--calling for all sides to work out a "settlement plan" that meets the wishes of the West Berlin population and considers the interests and sovereignty of the GDR. The Moscow-dated TASS account of the interview includes Kosygin's remarks on the four-power talks, but the brief summary in the Soviet press does not, nor does the 2 January domestic service account.

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Ulbricht broached the West Berlin problem and discussed GDR-FRG relations at length in his address to the nation. In apparent allusion to the recent traffic slowdowns around West Berlin, he charged that Western "propaganda has trumpeted forth for all the world to hear that West Berlin serves as a center for troublemaking against the GDR." But he stated that despite "troublemaking actions"--that is, "any unlawful state activity of the Federal Republic in West Berlin--the GDR had demonstrated its "unchangeable permanence." Declaring that it is time to reach agreements making possible normal relations between the two German states, Ulbricht noted that "concrete proposals" have already been submitted. He recalled that the GDR has expressed its "willingness to conclude an agreement on the mutual transit of traffic" between the GDR and the FRG if Bonn stops all its "troublemaking activities" in Berlin, and he added that it is "also prepared for a contractual settlement of relations between the GDR Government and the West Berlin Senat"--a settlement that would "largely meet the requirements of West Berlin citizens."

Ulbricht gave relatively short shrift to the four-power talks on Berlin, prefacing his remark on the "troublemaking activities" by noting in passing that the four powers' ambassadors have been meeting "for some time"--on the initiative, he said, of the socialist community. Professing "astonishment" over Bonn's attempt "to evade negotiations with the GDR on a normal agreement under international law on transit traffic" on the pretext that it "does not have the permission of the three Western powers" to do so, Ulbricht accused Bonn of seeking political capital rather than acting out of concern for the interests of the citizens of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. He concluded: "My advice to the government of the Federal Republic is to stop using the three Western powers as an excuse."

In his speech to the SED Central Committee plenum on 9 December--his last previous treatment of the Berlin question--Ulbricht had stated that a GDR-FRG agreement on reciprocal transit traffic would have a "positive effect" on the four-power talks and expressed the wish that the talks would bring a mutually acceptable agreement that meets the needs of the West Berliners and the interests and sovereign rights of the GDR. He drew no such connection between the four-power talks and the reciprocal transit issue in the New Year's eve address.*

* See the TRENDS of 16 December 1970, pages 14-15, for a discussion of the Central Committee speech.

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TREATIES WITH FRG In the New Year's eve address Ulbricht repeated his previously stated view of the significance of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn. Terming them the result of the peaceful policy of the socialist community, he maintained that the FRG's signature on the two treaties constitutes recognition of the status quo in Europe, including the East-West German border, and called upon West Germany to ratify them promptly. The TASS account of the address, while including Ulbricht's remarks on West Berlin and the four-power talks, quoted him with respect to the treaties as saying only that they are a product of postwar socialist policy and a contribution to European detente.

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S A L T

KOSYGIN SAYS USSR WOULD WELCOME "REASONABLE AGREEMENT"

Premier Kosygin's remarks on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in his year-end interview with the Japanese paper ASAHI, publicized in Soviet media, represent his first comments on the talks since August. At that time, in an interview with the New Delhi PATRIOT which was not reported in Soviet media, he said that the USSR approaches SALT with the "utmost seriousness" and that "despite the complexity of the problem, we intend to continue the talks and seek ways of checking strategic arms." Moscow media last publicized remarks by Kosygin on SALT on 5 March 1970, at the Moscow ceremony for deposition of the instruments of ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, when he stressed Soviet seriousness and the need for good will on both sides.*

In line with earlier elite and routine Soviet comment, Kosygin avoided substantive details about SALT in his remarks to ASAHI. He acknowledged that the questions under consideration "are not simple ones" and that an effort by both sides is necessary to achieve positive results. As Brezhnev had done in a 14 April speech at Kharkov, Kosygin said the USSR would welcome a "reasonable agreement," adding that this by definition would not be of a one-sided nature. (Tokyo's KYODO on 17 July, reporting a Moscow meeting between Suslov and a visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation, had quoted Suslov to the effect that the USSR hoped to reach an agreement despite U.S. efforts to achieve an accord "which would weaken Soviet power." These remarks were not reported in Moscow media.)

* SALT was last discussed by a high-level regime spokesman in October, when Gromyko in his UNGA speech voiced the hope that the talks would bring positive results. Ukrainian CP Central Committee Secretary Ovcharenko, in a Kiev speech carried in the 7 November issue of RADIANSKA UKRAINA, mentioned the talks in passing, noting that the world public had assessed them "positively." And Moscow publicized Soviet chief negotiator Semenov's appraisal of the talks following the wind-up of the second Helsinki phase on 18 December.

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Kosygin concluded with the standard observation that an agreement would meet the interests of the Soviet and American people as well as those of the people of the world and would contribute substantially to the strengthening of peace and international security.

Routine comment on SALT includes a talk for North American listeners on 29 December which restates Soviet seriousness toward the talks--scheduled to reconvene in Vienna on 15 March--and takes Washington to task for alleged failure to match its words about a desire for an accord with deeds. Thus the commentary takes note of U.S. failure to support the recent UNGA resolution calling on nuclear nations to halt the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. It also points to U.S. instigation of "a new round in the arms race" through development of advanced strategic weapons systems and to the U.S. decision to move ahead with the Safeguard ABM system "despite the warnings of many prominent politicians that this new military measure might undermine SALT."

Moscow continues to attack Peking's posture toward SALT in its broadcasts in Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress. A 5 January commentary says Peking disregards logic and rationality in characterizing the talks as a U.S.-Soviet "scheme" directed against the peoples of the world. The commentary charges Peking with engaging in empty rhetoric in professing a desire for complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Available Moscow reports on President Nixon's 4 January televised meeting with four American news commentators have not included his remarks on SALT. A TASS account on the 5th does note the President's observation that the process of negotiation can sometimes be extended and that negotiation "does not necessarily mean agreement."

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CUBAN ANNIVERSARY

SOVIET MESSAGE LAUDS CUBA AS CATALYST IN LATIN AMERICA

With Moscow and Havana on newly cordial terms during the past year, the Soviet greetings message on the Cuban revolution's 12th anniversary, 1 January, puts new stress on the catalytic role of Castro's revolution in stimulating the "national liberation movement" in Latin America, though it withholds any suggestion that Castro's method of achieving power merits general emulation. It also goes beyond prior anniversary greetings messages in terming Cuba an "inalienable part" of the socialist community; in recent previous years the Soviet messages had simply called for the cementing of bilateral friendship in the interests of socialist unity.

The message to Castro and Dorticos signed by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy--carried by TASS on 31 December--diverges from the Soviet greetings messages of recent years in crediting the Cuban revolution with having initiated "a new stage in the Latin American national liberation and revolutionary movement" and with inspiring Latin Americans to struggle for independence and "the liquidation of imperialist oppression and exploitation." Last year's message said only vaguely that the Cuban revolution had provided "a new stimulus to the peoples struggling for their social and national liberation," with no reference to its impact on Latin America. The 10th anniversary message said the Cuban revolution "once again confirmed" that only through the guidance of socialist ideas is it possible to free a country from "the yoke of the foreign monopolies, . . . exploitation, unemployment, poverty, and suppression of rights," again with no specific mention of its effect on Latin America.

Moscow media on 5 January reported the speech of CPSU Politburo member Mazurov at a Cuban embassy reception in which he noted "the further strengthening" of Cuban-Soviet friendship in the past year and declared that Cuba's triumphs inspire the Latin American masses "to struggle for a genuine national liberation against imperialist oppression and exploitation." In available reports of the speech delivered last year at the embassy anniversary reception, Politburo member Kirilenko was quoted as terming the Cuban revolution "an important milestone in the development of the world revolutionary process" and as noting

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that Cuba was the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere, but with no direct reference to the revolution's effect on the rest of the continent.

A 3 January Moscow radio commentary by NEW TIMES Observer Juan Cobo, reviewing "main achievements" of Latin America in 1970, extravagantly acclaimed the Cuban revolution as "the turning point in the development of Latin America" but went on to observe that "each" Latin American people "advances through his own, specific path toward the main common objective." A 30 December TASS commentary on the anniversary described Cuba's revolution as marking "a new stage" in the Latin American national liberation movement and as "breathing new strength and energy into the Latin American struggle for freedom and independence." Noting that Cuba was the first nation in the hemisphere to break "the chain of imperialist domination," TASS welcomed the appearance of "new weak links" in this chain in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia.

A noteworthy variation on this line appeared in a 30 December PRAVDA article by V. Korionov discussing "the upsurge" in the Latin American anti-imperialist struggle. Calling the Cuban revolution "the prologue" to the revolutionary process unfolding on the continent, Korionov said it confirmed that "the close link" between the Latin American liberation movement and "the world socialist system and the international communist movement" is a "guarantee" of the successful development of the liberation movement. In a remark perhaps aimed at Chile, Peru, and Bolivia--Latin American states which have in the past shown an active interest in nonalignment--Korionov declared that "history itself is defeating far-fetched arguments about the so-called 'third position' which hold that Latin American revolutionary movements "could supposedly stand aloof from the world socialist system."

CHINESE OBSERVANCE REGISTERS IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS

Peking's handling of the Cuban revolution anniversary mirrors the gradual but steady improvement in Sino-Cuban relations, which had reached their lowest ebb early in 1966 when Castro accused the Chinese of reneging on rice export commitments. On 2 January NCNA reported that an anniversary reception at the Cuban embassy in Peking was attended by Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee Kuo Mo-jo. Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih had been the ranking Chinese official at the embassy receptions marking the 10th and 11th anniversaries.

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The Chinese greetings message reported by NCNA on 31 December is still at the state-to-state level only; the anniversary message at the beginning of 1966 was the last to be signed by both party and state leaders (Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, respectively). But where prior messages since the 1966 rift had been signed only by Chou En-lai and addressed only to Fidel Castro, this one is addressed by PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu--who has been acting as chief of state--and Chou En-lai to Cuban President Dorticos as well as Castro.

While still cryptic, like all the messages since the rift in 1966, this year's is a shade warmer in tone. It states that "the heroic Cuban people have continued valiant struggles to resist U.S. imperialist aggression, interference, and blockade and safeguard national independence and state sovereignty," and it wishes the Cubans "new successes in this struggle." The 10th and 11th anniversary messages had said nothing about continuing "valiant" struggle, simply wishing the Cubans "new victories" against U.S. "aggression."

The warming trend in Sino-Cuban relations was manifested in Peking's appointment of an ambassador to Cuba, who presented his credentials to Dorticos on 15 December. The PRC had been represented by a charge d'affaires in Havana for more than three years, and Cuba is still represented by a charge d'affaires in Peking.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PARTY COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED IN THREE MORE PROVINCES

In a well-orchestrated welcome to the new year, NCNA announced on 31 December that three new provincial party committees had been established on 26 December, Mao's birthday--obvious though unspecified birthday gifts. As in Hunan, which established the first such committee on 4 December, the new party committees in Kwangtung, Kiangsu, and Kiangsi follow the pattern of interlocking leadership, with the provincial revolutionary committee chairman taking on the post of party first secretary in each case.

The NCNA announcements on each of the four party committees have stressed that there was full reliance on the principles of Mao and Lin in selecting leadership cadres and in adhering to the three-way alliance of old, middle-aged, and young. But there has been no claim, even in the follow-up material broadcast by the provincial radios concerned, that selection of the provincial party committees has been based on the triple-alliance formula blessed by Mao during the cultural revolution, that of PLA, cadres, and "mass representatives." (The old formula is still used at lower levels, as in a Sian report on the 30th regarding formation of a party committee in Yen-an county.)

The military, dominant in most provincial revolutionary committees, will probably dominate most of the upcoming party committees. Hunan was atypical in having a civilian as revolutionary committee chief, and the three new committees are led by military men. In each instance, however, there is at least one civilian among the secretaries. Although the committees have more members than their pre-cultural revolution counterparts, and Kiangsi claimed that the number of congress delegates and their breadth of representation were "unprecedented," there is still no mention of "mass representatives" actually being elected to the committees.

COMPARISON WITH 1956 Figures for the previous Kiangsi congress in 1956 are not available, but those provinces which did announce delegate numbers in 1956 indicate that the current congresses are indeed larger. Hunan, which had fewer than 600 representatives at its congress

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in 1956, had over 900 in 1970, and Kiangsu rose from 561 to 846. In 1956 Kiangsu elected 38 members and 13 alternates to its committee compared to the current 56 members and 33 alternates, but the trend is apparently reversed when it comes to the leadership organs of the committee. Only nine were named to the Kiangsu standing committee in the 1970 plenum following the congress, compared to 14 previously. Of these only five are secretaries. Thus meaningful power is apparently more restricted than before, even discounting PLA dominance on the committee.

This concentration of real power does not in itself indicate a defeat for Maoist "people's power" which has always been more consultative than actual. One of the complaints by Mao that brought about the cultural revolution was that he could not get his programs implemented. The old system whereby discrete organizations and often different personnel were in charge of the party, the government, and the army made the center's task of forcing local obedience more difficult.

This consideration is evident in some of the editorial comment on the new committees. A KIANGSI DAILY editorial broadcast on 2 January warns that leading party groups must be built on a solid basis to "guarantee the implementation" of Mao's line. The Kiangsu editorial celebrating the new committee, broadcast on 1 January, stressed that "we must further intensify the centralized leadership of the party over every front. All units . . . should, under the leadership of the party committee, implement to the letter the line, principle, and policies of Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee."

KIANGSI COMMITTEE Although Kiangsi had announced fewer new county committees than the other provinces which have formed provincial party committees, it has been among the politically most advanced and perhaps "revolutionary" provinces since the formation of its revolutionary committee in January 1968. During that year in particular it seemed to be acting as an area for central economic experimentation--for example, popularizing the merger of teams and brigades.

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Most of the new leaders have been prominent in the province since the revolutionary committee was formed: Chairman Cheng Shih-ching is now first secretary and the leading vice chairman, Yang Tung-liang, is secretary. The other four original revolutionary committee vice chairmen were not made party secretaries although some still appear and may be on the standing committee. Both new deputy secretaries were named as vice chairmen in May 1970, and one, Wen Tao-hung, was an original member of the revolutionary committee standing committee. The other, Pai Tung-tsai, is a former party committee secretary criticized during the cultural revolution, and the only civilian secretary.

KIANGSU COMMITTEE All those named to party secretary posts in Kiangsu have been active in this unusually stable province since its revolutionary committee was established in March 1968. As in Kiangsi, all but one--Peng Chung--are military men. Chairman (and Politburo member) Hsu Shih-yu was named first secretary, and three of the four original vice chairmen were retained in the top leadership including secretary Wu Ta-sheng and deputy secretaries Yang Kuang-li and Peng Chung. The other secretary is Tu Ping, second political commissar of the Nanking Military Region, who was also recently identified as a responsible person of the revolutionary committee.

KWANGTUNG COMMITTEE Since the transfer of former Canton military and Kwangtung provincial chief Huang Yung-sheng to the post of PLA chief of staff, the province has been closely linked to the center, with several military figures joining Huang in Peking. Kwangtung has been a leader in publicizing new party committees, including the first municipal committee, Maoming, in February 1969.

The new first secretary Liu Hsing-yuan was confirmed as provincial chief in July 1969. Both he and first vice chairman Kung Shih-chuan, elected secretary, have been political commissars in the Canton region. The other new secretaries are Canton commander Ting Sheng and two civil cadres active in the old Central-South party bureau, Chen Yu and Wang Shou-tao. Chen is also former governor of Kwangtung.

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JOINT EDITORIAL INDICATES LITTLE CHANGE IN 1971 GOALS

The 1971 joint new year's editorial of RED FLAG, PEOPLE'S DAILY, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY indicates little change from the domestic course set at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.* The stress on senior cadre study sessions, a major part of PRC propaganda over the past fall, is to continue. Economic goals continue to be vague, although apparently there is a yearly plan as well as the fourth five-year plan for guidance. There are no indications of a new "leap forward" strategy. The editorial specifies only that the 50th anniversary of the party will be celebrated, the NPC convened, and the Paris Commune centenary observed in 1971.

The editorial is crammed with Mao quotations, most of them old or attributed to speeches at the ninth congress. Only one is alleged (by NCNA on 1 January) to be a "new" instruction: "Carry out education on ideology and political lines." The last previous "new" Mao instructions appeared in the New Year's Day editorial for 1970, and they were in fact originally uttered some months before.

The major difference between this editorial and those in recent years is the omission of any phrases that would ascribe an important civil role to any organ except the party. In 1970 "consolidation and perfection of the revolutionary committees" was still listed as a major goal, and the PLA was told to continue its good work in "two supports and three militaries." The 1971 editorial seems to assume that revolutionary committees are now under party control. More significantly, the editorial does not mention the PLA's civilian role. Instead the PLA is merely told to "continue to enhance revolutionization and militancy in army building," by carrying out the requirements for "four good" units.

While the editorial does not specifically call for the establishment of party committees at all levels during the coming year, it does indicate a measure of urgency by terming it "necessary" to "successfully convene the local party congresses at various levels." It also calls for further consolidation of the Communist Youth League.

* For a discussion of the international aspects of the editorial see the "Sino-Soviet Relations" section of this TRENDS.

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NCNA CLAIMS 1970 A GOOD YEAR ECONOMICALLY FOR CHINA

The end-of-year economic claims issued by NCNA are, as tradition dictates, full of praise for the valiant efforts of the Chinese people in following Mao's thought to economic victory. A general agricultural roundup released on 30 December said that the total and per-hectare grain output exceeded previous records. Total grain output records have been claimed in most though not all recent years. The per-hectare claim is more unusual and seems to reflect the current stress on stepping up production from available land through increased use of fertilizer rather than opening up new marginal lands to cultivation.

The NCNA claims in regard to most provinces are in the area of a 10-percent increase in grain output. But a grouping of reports released on 31 December ranged up to a claim for a 30-percent increase in Kirin, both in total and per-hectare output.

Reports on industrial production stress the importance of small plants in achieving and surpassing current goals. Percentage increases are alleged less frequently and less specifically than in the field of agriculture, and the usual claim is simply that quotas have been achieved a month ahead of time. In making such a claim for Liaoning on 31 December, NCNA also noted that the province's industrial production had increased 25 percent in value over 1969. On the same day NCNA stated that the value of Peking's industrial output was up one-third over last year and double that of 1965. Another claim on the 31st noted that the production of equipment for light industry in China was 30 percent greater in 1970 than in the previous year.

On 26 December, NCNA reported that industrial production in Inner Mongolia for the first 11 months of 1970 was 62 percent above the corresponding period in 1969. Concomitantly, however, NCNA claimed only a standard one-month early achievement of 1970 goals. Perhaps the figures are indicative of the extent of the difficulties in Inner Mongolia in 1969, the year the region was partially divided among its neighbors.

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An underlying theme for many of the economic claims continues to be area self-sufficiency to the extent possible. As well as fitting in with some of Mao's theories, no doubt such an achievement would ease the strain on the transportation industry. The 30 December NCNA agricultural roundup touched on this theme with the claim that for the first time Hopeh, Honan, and Shantung "ended their long-standing dependence on the state" for grain supplies and could even support neighboring provinces. Several articles on coal production in Chekiang noted that the proliferation of small coal mines there would help end the traditional need to transport coal from the north to the south. Chekiang, apparently a national model in this field, claimed on the 27th that this year's production was 3.5 times that of last year; but the province is still not claiming self-sufficiency. Kwangtung reportedly produced twice as much coal in 1970 as in 1969, to "provide a solid basis for realizing the province's aim of self-sufficiency in coal."

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